Happiness

Nominalists hold that God’s metaphysical essence is in the sum of all his perfections. The problem with this nominalist conception is that the sum of all his perfections does not only consist of the metaphysical but also the physical. This is so because “the Word became flesh” (John 1:14). Now, Jesus is perfect in all of his being, even his human side, one of the reasons being that he had all “but sin” (CCC 467). Therefore, the physical nature of Jesus is also what constitutes God being perfect.

The three methods of the natural knowledge of God by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite are as follows: (1) affirmation or causality, (2) negation, and (3) eminence. Firstly, affirmation or causality considers the principle of proportionate causality, which is when that which is caused must be in the causer. The causer being superior to the caused follows from the principle of proportionate causality because the causer not only has the things due to itself, it also has the caused. Creation is caused, so, that which is the causer is superior to creation. Superiority in this case is evidence for God. Secondly, negation, which is that potentiality in creations are not found in God. The denial of potentially being attributed to God is not just a special pleading denial. It is a denial of limitation. God does not have limitations, but is limitless, so limitations cannot be attributed to God. Thirdly, eminence, which is the idea that finitism found in creatures participates in the infinite God....

What is so special about God? Why do people believe in God? It seems like one answer is sufficient for this, and that is that we believe because of existence. What imparts existence (that a thing is) to a thing's essence (what a thing is)? If I have a gorilla, he has existence and also an essence. Yet, it is the case that his essence and existence is separable. If it is separable, then that means it is conjoined somehow. The gorilla does not seem to have the ability to conjoin his own essence and existence together because then he would need to have been in existence prior to either his essence or existence or both to conjoin his essence and existence. I was tempted to say that a thing which is nonexistent cannot cause anything. But saying so unqualified surely is not true. Consider a unicorn, which is nonexistent and has some causal powers on my brain to think about what it looks like. Obviously this universe causes some state in my brain at least. So my statement needs to be qual...

A proponent of the argument from change in proof of God’s existence might say that existential inertia only applies as properties of a substance. So, when the argument from change uses water as an example of a hierarchical series of changes, it does not fail to demonstrate an unactualized actualizer because existential inertia does not apply to the substance water but only to the properties of water. This argument from the proponent seems implausible for the following reasons: No justification is brought forth as to why existential inertia only applies as properties of a substance. One could arguably defend the position that existential inertia applies as a thing which is neither a property nor a substance and yet it is casually active on every single substance (as maybe a universal). If this position is true, existential inertia would apply even for hierarchical series of changes. Even if existential inertia were really just properties of a substance, the substance would still be affe...

  Pace the abortionist, from the armchair: 1. One necessary feature of being a human is that it has to only have one nature. 2. The nature of an ovum is numerically different from the nature of a sperm. 3. An ovum has one necessary feature of being a human in that it has to only have one nature. 4. But a human is not an ovum. 5. A sperm has one necessary feature of being a human in that it has to only have one nature. 6. But a human is not a sperm. 7. A human is not a sperm and an ovum considered as numerically different natures (follows from premises 1 and 2)     8. Only one nature is formed at conception/fertilization from the fusing of the numerically different natures of a sperm and an ovum. 9. Call this only one nature formed at conception/fertilization from the fusing of the numerically different natures of a sperm and an ovum by “N.” 10. So, N has one necessary feature of being a human in that it only has one nature (follows from premises 1, 8 and 9). 11....

 I tried ruling out an infinite regress of changes today by proposing that there must be some fundamental being in reality, which is an unchanged changer (see Aristotle and Aquinas First Way to the existence of God to see how this works). An objection that came up to my ruling out an infinite regress of changes is proposed by saying that there is a single universe which after its life is terminated will repeatedly come into existence again ad infinitum. It is demonstrated by a ring which is split in half, and the ring would be analogous to the universe's existence. It is after the ring terminates in its existence does it flip itself around and so and then after that existence terminates it will flip itself around again, ad infinitum, analogously to the universe.  I say this is a problematic objection for many reasons. Firstly, a potential being actualized is precisely how "change" is defined in Thomism. With that said, I pointed out that this is still a series of changes ...