college kid sex questions—ANSWERED!
Fornication (sex outside marriage) is wrong
Same-sex-sexual acts (homosexual acts) are wrong
According to Pruss, erotic (sexual) acts are meant to consummate a real, bodily union that reflects a natural, male–female complementarity. In same-sex sexual activity, such a union is biologically impossible. Engaging in orgasmic acts with a partner of the same sex therefore creates a misleading feeling of “deep union” where none can exist. This illusion not only deceives oneself but also treats the other person as if they were naturally capable of that union, misrepresenting their very nature.
Verbatim quotation
“I have argued in the previous chapter that it is wrong to intentionally induce orgasm outside of the context of penile-vaginal intercourse, because to do so would be to create an illusion of a sexual union in the absence of such union. In the same-sex case, it would create an illusion of a deep union in the absence of the possibility of such union, an illusion that would rest on a misunderstanding of the realities involved. Not only is it that sexual union has not yet taken place together with this person, but there cannot be sexual union with this person.
But there is an even more serious problem in the same-sex case. In feeling united sexually with someone—and sexual pleasure is one way of having such a feeling—one is affectively treating the other person as someone with whom such union is possible. Indeed, the feeling of sexual pleasure and union is both a kind of completion of the union of erotic love, and something that calls out for erotic love by presenting the other person as erotically lovable. When these feelings are manifested toward someone with whom such union is impossible, and impossible not just due to a disability on the part of either or both (in that case, we could still say that the other is someone with whom normally one could unite sexually), one is affectively misconstruing the other person’s nature—treating the other as in a relevant way able to be united with one, when the other is not.
The Old Testament condemned the man who slept with a man ‘as with a woman’ (Lev. 20:13). We see here that this description is not inapt, since the feeling of sexual pleasure makes the man appreciate the other as someone with whom he is sexually uniting, but if the argument of this book is correct, he can, in principle, only sexually unite with a woman, and hence the other man is in a sense treated as a woman.”
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Positive contraception is fundamentally different from Natural Family Planning (NFP), with verbatim quotations:
- Definition of “positive contraception.”
Pruss begins by defining the term precisely:
“I will say that a sexual act has been positively contracepted provided one has intentionally acted so as to make the act be such as not to result in reproduction.”
- Intentional frustration vs. mere timing.
He argues that what makes positive contraception wrong is the intention to thwart the reproductive striving of the sexual union. In his kidney‐and‐liver analogy, he shows that simply using an organ for another purpose isn’t enough to condemn—but contraception goes further:
“in the case of contraception, one is intentionally impeding good functioning.”
- Species‐directed function.
Among our bodily systems, only the reproductive system is “directed to a goal outside of us, the existence of a new human being.” Since that goal does not serve our own survival, deliberately frustrating it is morally significant:
“The reproductive system is directed to a goal outside of us, the existence of a new human being. … Thus, when the reproductive system’s functioning is frustrated, it is not for the sake of any further purpose of that reproductive system.”
- Contrast with NFP‐based periodic abstinence.
By contrast, NFP users simply refrain from intercourse on fertile days; they do nothing to render a specific act of intercourse infertile:
“In the case of positive contraception … one can say that the couple did something to render that act sterile. … On the other hand, in the case of periodic abstinence … their engagement in sexual activity during infertile times also does nothing to make the acts sterile … So nothing they do renders their act infertile, and hence they have not contradicted the innate reproductive striving of the act.”
- Practical effectiveness and Church teaching.
Finally, Pruss notes that when there is a serious reason to avoid pregnancy, NFP is both effective and, on the Church’s own admission, morally licit:
“the weight of philosophical argument is in favor of this teaching. … the cost of refraining from positive contraception need be no greater than the cost of engaging in periodic abstinence from sex.”
- In sum, positive contraception involves an active intent to thwart the reproductive striving of a particular sexual act, disrupting the bodily “one‐flesh” union, whereas Natural Family Planning merely times intercourse without thwarting reproductive striving.
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stuff on desire
- Desire is not infallibly known.
One can act from desires one does not consciously feel, and one can be mistaken about what one truly desires.
“I am going to argue that it is possible not to understand one’s own desires – not to know what it is that one desires.”
- Desires have objectivity and content.
Desires explain our actions only insofar as they are aimed at some value or object; misunderstanding that object leads to error in action.
“Sometimes we just want something, have no idea what we want, misidentify the object of our desires quite badly, and end up miserable.”
- Not all desires are good.
Pruss rejects any view according to which every desire is per se positive. There are non-instrumental desires that are simply inappropriate because their objects are not truly desirable.
“Are there non-instrumental desires that are simply inappropriate to have …? A positive answer also seems correct here.”
- A “good” desire is one whose object is genuinely valuable simpliciter.
Desiring what is truly good—whether instrumentally or non-instrumentally—is itself good, even if the desire fails or goes unfulfilled, because it pursues a worthy end.
“To work for a good goal is good even when the activity is not conscious, and even if the activity does not succeed.”
- There are “bad” desires—desires for objects that are not desirable in themselves.
He illustrates this with the extreme example of a brainwashed urge to eat dirt: such a desire, having no genuine value, is objectively inappropriate (though the agent may not be blameworthy if the desire is implanted).
“It is not hard to imagine being brainwashed to desire to eat dirt for its own sake, and this non-instrumental desire would be inappropriate ….”
- Desires can also be instrumentally mistaken.
One may desire something as a means to an end without realizing it: e.g. mistakenly craving caviar as a cure for cancer. Such errors show that desires must be assessed both for their ends and for the correctness of their means.
“Either an independent desire for caviar simpliciter has arisen, with no good rational reason for such a desire … or else the person desires caviar as a cure for cancer, while believing that caviar is not a cure for cancer.”
- In sum:
Desires are intentional states directed at objects or ends, which we can misunderstand.
Good desires aim at what is genuinely valuable, whether or not the end is reached.
Bad desires aim at objects that are not desirable in themselves—there is such a thing as an inappropriate or disordered desire.
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